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CONVENTIONS
 
Hyphenated sentences  Hyphenated sentences indicate single signs or constructions 
which cannot be properly conveyed in a single English word, 
for example: MAN-WALKED-DOWN-THE-ROAD would 
be a single sign in American Sign Language. 
    
Words in all caps A convention in sign language linguistics in which an all-caps 
word such as ASK is used to represent the sign “ask” in the 
prose. 
x 
ABSTRACT 
The goal of this thesis is to propose that resemblance plays an important role in 
human communication. Saussure proposed a characteristic principle of the linguistic sign: 
that connections between linguistic codes and the objects they signify are arbitrary; 
however, I intend to show that resemblance, which I define as the visual or aural 
similarity between a stimulus, the thought it is intended to activate, and the real world 
target that utterance is about, is an important part of human communication and should be 
taken into consideration when defining language and proposing theories of human 
communication.   
I have chosen Relevance Theory as the framework for this analysis because it 
highlights the importance of inferential communication. According to Relevance Theory, 
human communication is guided by expectations of relevance, a balance between 
cognitive effects (information the addressee finds worthwhile) and processing effort (the 
amount of work required to understand that information). Human communication reduces 
the amount of processing effort through conventionalization; words signify concepts, 
starting points from which inference can be used to arrive at a communicator’s intended 
meaning. I suggest that the range of human perception and experience acts as common 
ground between communicators, providing a shared context between communicator and 
addressee and reducing what must be explicitly communicated. Essentially, resemblance 
between an utterance and an intended thought performs a similar function to 
conventionalization, activating concepts from shared context and providing a starting 
xi 
point for inferential communication, guiding addresses to the communicator’s intended 
meaning.  
My claim that resemblance has a role to play in human communication raises 
significant questions about the widely held stance that language is inherently arbitrary. I 
have proposed that signs can meaningfully resemble the things they signify; if this is true, 
we must consider the implications for modern linguistic analysis and adjust linguistic 
theory to accurately account for the use of resemblance in human communication. 
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CHAPTER 1                                                                      
INTRODUCTION 
The goal of this thesis is to propose that resemblance plays an important role in 
human communication. I define resemblance as the visual or aural similarity between a 
stimulus (such as a spoken or signed utterance), the thought it is intended to activate, 
(mental representation in the mind of a human) and the real world target (situation, 
object, other utterance, etc.) that utterance is about. I present examples from both spoken 
and signed language in which resemblance contrasts with the Saussurean model of 
language. Saussure (1959:67–70) proposed a characteristic principle of the linguistic 
sign: that connections between linguistic codes and the objects they signify are arbitrary; 
however, he went on to suggest that “when semiology becomes organized as a science, 
the question will also arise whether or not it properly includes modes of expression based 
on completely natural signs, such as pantomime.” What Saussure refers to as “natural 
signs” is what I intend to show as resemblance, and is highly valued by human 
communication and should be taken into consideration when defining language and 
proposing theories of human communication.  
The framework I have chosen for this analysis is Relevance Theory, a theoretical 
approach primarily concerned with the field of pragmatics, loosely described as “the 
study of language use, as opposed to language structure” (Wilson & Sperber 2012). I 
believe that Relevance Theory is the best framework for this analysis because it 
highlights the importance of inferential communication. Wilson and Sperber (2012:2) 
explain inferential communication in the following way:  
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“On the inferential view, utterances are not signals, but 
pieces of evidence about the speaker’s meaning, and 
comprehension is achieved by inferring this meaning from 
evidence provided not only by the utterance but also by the 
context.” 
According to Relevance Theory, human communication is guided by expectations of 
relevance, a balance between cognitive effects (information the addressee finds 
worthwhile) and processing effort (the amount of work required to understand that 
information) (Wilson & Sperber 2012). I hypothesize that cognitive benefits can be 
augmented and processing effort can be reduced through the use of resemblance.  
Specifically, I suggest that the range of human perception and experience acts as common 
ground, providing a shared context between communicator and addressee. This shared 
context can include knowledge about the world and how it works, in areas such as 
physics, spatial relationships, size, shape, human function and behavior, and more, and 
reduces what must be explicitly communicated. Essentially, resemblance between an 
utterance and an intended thought can then serve as a starting point for inferential 
communication.  
While both spoken and signed languages make use of the resemblance between signs 
and the things they signify, signed languages are especially enabled by the visual 
modality to leverage the benefits of resemblance-oriented communication. Simply put, 
signed language communication is produced in the same modality as the things it 
signifies; an utterance meant to describe a falling tree can look like a tree falling over, 
even if the resemblance is fairly abstract.  
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Ultimately, I conclude that the use of resemblance in human communication has 
implications for theories of language as arbitrary, applications for pragmatic theory, and 
our understanding of human communication in general. I begin with an introduction of 
Relevance Theory in Chapter 2, followed by a theoretical description of resemblance in 
Chapter 3. Chapters 4 and 5 describe examples of resemblance in spoken and signed 
languages respectively. Chapter 6 describes the impact of resemblance on cross-linguistic 
communication.   
4 
 
CHAPTER 2  
INTRODUCTION TO REVELANCE THEORY 
Relevance theory is a theoretical framework proposed and developed primarily by 
Sperber and Wilson (1986; 1995; 2012). Its goal is to explain the processes underlying 
human communication, including a particular focus on how addressees interpret and 
understand a communicator’s intentions by means of inference and decoding (Wilson & 
Sperber 2012). Relevance theory can be contrasted with the traditional code theory of 
communication, a classical view of human communication as a system of simple 
encoding of thoughts into an utterance on the speaker’s end and decoding the utterance 
into concepts on the hearer’s side (Saussure 1959). 
2.1 Basics of Relevance Theory  
The capstone of Relevance Theory is relevance itself, defined by Sperber and Wilson 
(2012:38) below:  
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“Relevance is defined as a property of inputs to cognitive 
processes. The processing of an input (e.g. an utterance) 
may yield some cognitive effects (e.g. revisions of beliefs). 
Everything else being equal, the greater the effects, the 
greater the relevance of the input. The processing of the 
input (and the derivation of these effects) involves some 
mental effort. Everything else being equal the greater the 
effort, the lower the relevance.” 
Simply stated, any act of human communication is relevant if the cognitive effects match 
or outweigh the processing effort of understanding the communication. Cognitive effects 
can be loosely defined as any change of the addressee’s thoughts or assumptions; they 
could be as simple as learning what time it is, or as complex as understanding that the 
speaker is telling the hearer the time because they do not want the hearer to be late for 
class. Cognitive effects can function to strengthen or weaken existing assumptions, as 
well (Wilson & Sperber 2012). Along with the above definition, Sperber and Wilson 
(2012:64–65) posited the following two principles, critical to this thesis: 
 
“The first, or Cognitive, Principle of Relevance: The  
human cognitive system tends toward processing the most 
relevant inputs available.” 
“The second, or Communicative, Principle of Relevance: 
Every utterance conveys a presumption of its own optimal 
relevance.” 
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These principles make the claim that for human communication to be successful, the 
speaker must attempt to make their utterance optimally relevant to their audience, and the 
addressee must expect that utterance to be optimally relevant. A wide range of factors 
must be taken into consideration for this to succeed, such as context (what the speaker 
and addressee both know and do not know, for example), held beliefs, etc. 
Communication can easily break down when, for example, the speaker assumes the 
addressee knows something which the addressee does not.  
Given these principles and an understanding of relevance, an outline of the process 
by which utterances are understood begins to emerge, suggested by Sperber et. al (1995), 
referred to as the relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure: 
 
(i) Considering possible cognitive effects in their order of 
accessibility (i.e., following a path of least effort); and 
(ii) Stopping when the expected level of relevance is 
achieved (or appears unachievable). 
2.2 Components of communication 
Relevance Theory provides a framework for understanding ostensive inferential 
communication and acknowledges that human communication takes place on several 
different levels. Many of the distinctions which Relevance Theory makes are important 
for understanding my claims about the use of resemblance in communication. In the 
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following sections, I introduce and briefly discuss the relevant distinctions made by the 
theory.  
2.2.1 Ostensively communication vs. non-ostensive communication   
 The first distinction which Relevance Theory makes is between ostensive and non-
ostensive communication. This distinction is essentially based on the speaker’s intention; 
ostensive communication can be defined as any communication which is intended to 
inform the hearer and conveys that intention to communicate (Wilson & Sperber 2012). It 
is to this type of communication, in which both speaker and hearer are aware of the 
intention to communicate, as summarized by the communicative principle of relevance, 
to which Relevance Theory applies. Non-ostensively communication is anything which is 
communicated unintentionally, such as blushing at embarrassment.  
2.2.2 Linguistic communication vs. non-linguistic communication 
The next level of distinction is between linguistically and non-linguistically 
communicated information. Linguistically communicated information is anything which 
can be understood based on an addressee’s knowledge of a language, while non-
linguistically encoded information is that which is language independent. Possible 
examples of non-linguistic information include tone of voice, facial expression, body 
language, cultural indicators, and other clues which a speaker’s understanding of the 
language itself will not explain. While gesture and non-verbal communication such as 
posture, eye gaze, tone of voice, etc. are often considered non-linguistic, signed 
languages clearly show linguistic use of manual articulators and non-verbal 
communication.  
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The division between non-linguistic gesticulation and signed language is generally 
referred to as Kendon’s continuum, with gesticulation at one end and signed language at 
the other (McNeill 1992:37). Kendon’s continuum is reproduced in Figure 1 below 
(McNeill 1992): 
Table 1. Kendon’s Continuum 
Gesticulation Language-like 
Gestures 
Pantomimes  Emblems Sign language 
“idiosyncratic 
spontaneous 
movements of the 
hands and arms 
accompanying 
speech” 
 
“grammatically 
integrated into 
the utterance” 
For example, if 
the phrase ‘he 
was executed’ 
was replace by a 
throat-slitting 
gesture.  
“The hands 
depict objects 
or actions, but 
speech is not 
obligatory.” 
“Emblems have 
standards of 
well-
formedness” 
and include 
conventional 
gestures such as 
the ‘OK sign’ 
or ‘the finger.’  
“full-fledged 
linguistic systems 
with 
segmentation, 
compositionality, 
a lexicon, a 
syntax, 
distinctiveness, 
arbitrariness…” 
 
Working from a Relevance Theory definition, only sign language, at the far right of 
Kendon’s continuum, would be considered linguistically communicated. I hypothesize 
that evidence of resemblance could be found along the entire continuum, but that is 
outside the scope of this thesis.  
The distinction between linguistic and non-linguistic communication is important to 
this thesis because signed languages are similar to gesture in two key ways. First, because 
both use manual articulators, and second, because both make use of resemblance. In the 
section below, I discuss the next distinction made by relevance theory, the difference 
between linguistically encoded and non-linguistically encoded information.  
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2.2.3 Linguistically encoded vs. not linguistically encoded information 
Wilson and Sperber (2012) also point out the differences between linguistically 
encoded and non-linguistically encoded information. Linguistically encoded information 
is anything that can be understood from an utterance using knowledge of the language, 
such as syntax rules. Non-linguistically encoded information is that which contributes to 
the understanding of an utterance, but not through linguistic structure. Basically, in a 
given utterance, an addressee can understand things from the utterance which are 
independent of the codes themselves but no less substantial. Wilson and Sperber give an 
example using and in which two propositions are equated, but it is understood that there 
is a causal relationship between them. Wilson and Sperber’s example is reproduced 
below in Example 1 (Wilson & Sperber 2012:153): 
 
Example 1. Non-linguistically encoded communication.  
(A) Peter got angry and Mary left. 
(B) Mary left and Peter got angry. 
 
As far as linguistic encoding is concerned, these sentences mean the same thing: that both 
propositions happened; however, Wilson and Sperber point out that in reality, they are 
understood as causal, such that Mary left because Peter got angry in (A) or that Peter got 
angry because Mary left in (B). This understanding is not due to linguistic encoding, but 
instead, as Wilson and Sperber suggest, through inferential enrichment in accord with the 
cognitive principle of relevance. Since “Every utterance conveys a presumption of its 
own optimal relevance,” (Wilson & Sperber 2012:64–65) the hearer can expect the 
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utterance to provide them with cognitive effects (new information). Thus, in the right 
context, the hearer can understand that Peter got angry because Mary left, since otherwise 
the utterance would not achieve relevance. Related to this is the distinction between 
explicatures and implicatures, discussed in the next section.  
2.2.4 Explicatures and implicatures 
Relevance Theory makes a distinction between what is communicated explicitly and 
implicitly. Sperber and Wilson (1986) used the term “explicature” to refer to the fully-
propositional forms of an utterance, after referent assignment and disambiguation. 
Inference often plays a part in enrichment, as well. The following sentence shows the 
difference between what is said and the explicatures: “He arrived before her” might have 
explicatures such as “John arrived at time x which was earlier than Sue, who arrived at 
time y”.  
“Implicature” refers to what is implied—things communicated by an utterance in a 
given context but not explicitly present in the utterance itself (Sperber & Wilson 1986). 
Implicatures are understood through inference, and can often be thought of as the logical 
steps taken from the utterance to arrive at the speaker’s intended meaning (Wilson & 
Sperber 2012:77). To continue with the above example, if someone asked “Was John late 
for Sue’s party?” and was answered by the utterance “He arrived before her,” the 
implicature is that John was not late for Sue’s party.  
Related to explicatures is the idea of ad-hoc concepts, which can be used in the 
creation of explicatures.  
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2.2.5 Ad-hoc concepts 
The fine-tuning and manipulation of concepts on the fly, referred to in relevance theory 
as ad-hoc concepts, is particularly important for this thesis. Ad-hoc concepts are 
identified by Wilson and Sperber (2012:16–23) as the components of an utterance which 
are deemed relevant (by following the relevance theoretic comprehension procedure) and 
therefore used in the construction of the explicature. For example, in metaphor, an 
utterance such as “Dan is a machine” can be quite vague; however, in certain contexts, 
the connection between the two concepts is stronger or weaker based on the relevance of 
the individual characteristics of Dan and machine. In one context, the speaker could 
mean that Dan is efficient; while in another, the speaker could mean that Dan is 
emotionless, or perhaps in a third context both meanings are relevant. Relevance theory 
suggests that all human communication functions more or less in the same way, with 
relevance determining which elements of underspecified codes are to be included in the 
comprehension process and which are not, narrowing or broadening the use of the 
concept to achieve relevance. This is most relevant to this thesis in that the inferential 
comprehension of resemblance in communication is basically ad-hoc, meaning that 
whenever an ostensive act of communication resembles a target, the addressee must, by 
following the relevance theoretic comprehension procedure, choose which parts of the 
resemblance are relevant, creating an ad hoc concept. This process of choosing what is 
relevant is often constrained by lexical items, which Relevance Theory accounts for with 
the distinction between conceptual and procedural communication.  
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2.2.6 Conceptual vs. procedural communication 
 The distinction between conceptual and procedural communication is important for 
the purpose of this thesis. Traditionally, as defined by Wilson and Sperber, (1986; 1995; 
2012) conceptually encoded information is that part of linguistic communication which 
deals with concepts (such as objects, people, emotions, or anything else which bring to 
mind an addressee’s knowledge or experience). Conceptual information makes up the 
bulk of our utterances and is primarily conventionalized; the word cat triggers all we 
know about cats, and the connection between them is learned. Conversely, procedurally 
coded information consists of instructions for how to process and manipulate 
information, either from the utterance or from context. Examples of procedurally encoded 
information include things like pronouns, discourse connectives, conjunctions, and 
logical connectives.  
Procedural elements can constrain and clarify both explicatures and implicatures. 
Constraints on explicatures limit the possible logically enriched forms of an utterance, 
such as pronouns in English, which procedurally instruct the addressee to replace the 
pronoun with a referent; the pronoun is critical to understanding the fully propositional 
form of an utterance, but the pronoun itself does not encode conceptual information. 
Addressees cannot properly understand an utterance with a pronoun unless they can pick 
out the intended referent for the pronoun. 
 Procedural constraints on higher-level explicatures can be phrases like the English 
after all, which communicates that the proposition is mutually manifest to both the 
speaker/signer and addressee, but does not change the basic proposition (Blass 2000). For 
example, in the utterance “Are you sure you should be skydiving? After all, you are very 
13 
 
old”, after all would constrain the higher level explicature to something like “We both 
know you are very old.”  
Examples of constraints on implicatures include discourse connectives such as so 
which essentially serve to limit the possible implicatures when they might be unclear, 
based on context. (Blakemore 1992).  
Wilson (2011:17) discusses a proposal presented in the Relevance email archives list 
by Dan Sperber. Sperber hypothesizes that “all lexical items encode procedures…When a 
conceptual content is encoded, so is an instruction to inferentially construct an ad hoc 
concept using the encoded conceptual content as a starting point.” While Sperber’s 
hypothesis is primarily focused on the distinction between conceptual and procedural 
encoding, the idea that communication of any kind provides a starting point for inference 
is key to this thesis.  
Ultimately, the distinction between conceptual and procedural is important because 
some constructions common in signed languages have been analyzed as using procedural 
strategies which instruct the addressee to pick out a referent, much like spoken language 
pronouns. In the next section, I describe the Relevance Theory distinction between 
different types of representation.  
2.2.7 Descriptive vs. interpretive representation, metarepresentation, and 
interpretive resemblance 
 
Relevance theory generally distinguishes between two different uses of language: 
descriptive representation and interpretive representation (Wilson & Sperber 2012; 1986). 
Wilson and Sperber (2012:218) define descriptive representation as the “relation between 
thoughts or utterances and possible or actual states of affairs which make or would make 
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them true.” Essentially, descriptive representation occurs whenever the utterance is meant 
to be understood literally, i.e. the representation is totally (or as much as possible) 
equated with the intended target, be it a situation, characteristic, or other utterance. In a 
phrase such as “The car drove around the cone,” the word car is used descriptively to 
mean a literal car. Conversely, interpretive representation is defined as “the relation 
between thoughts or utterances and other thoughts and utterances that they resemble in 
content” (Wilson & Sperber 2012:218). This type of representation is used when 
speaking figuratively, in which only parts of the utterance are meant to represent the real 
or possible world, such as when summarizing, indirectly quoting, or using metaphor 
(Wilson & Sperber 2012).  
Along with the ability to represent objects in the real world, humans have the ability 
to contemplate and describe the representations of those objects in an abstract way, 
essentially thinking about a thought or talking about an utterance iteratively, referred to 
as metarepresentation (Wilson & Sperber 2012). Aside from letting humans think about 
the thoughts of others (critical for making utterances optimally relevant to an addressee), 
it allows for the reuse of utterances in different contexts, ranging from direct quotation to 
loose use. Some quotation makes use of similarity in content known as interpretive 
resemblance. Wilson and Sperber (Wilson & Sperber 2012:244) define this as 
“resemblance in content: that is, sharing of implications. Two representations resemble 
each other (in a context) to the extent that they share logical and contextual implications”. 
In addition to all of the distinctions made in this chapter, I believe that human 
communication also makes use of descriptive resemblance, the resemblance I have 
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defined as the visual or aural similarity between a stimulus or a thought and the real 
world target.  
Signed languages make use of descriptive representation, interpretive representation, 
and metarepresentation. They also make use of interpretive resemblance, in which a 
subset of the resemblance between two targets is used to communicate. I am proposing in 
this thesis that signed languages also make use of another layer of descriptive 
representation, descriptive resemblance, a term not used in the literature (but which 
logically follows from Sperber and Wilson’s discussion of descriptive and interpretive 
representation (Wilson & Sperber 2012:244)) which I define as a more literal 
resemblance between a target in the real or possible world and the linguistic 
communication itself. While the theoretical details behind this claim are primarily outside 
the scope of this thesis, I argue that many signed language communication strategies 
make use of resemblance in ways which show strong correlation between the real world 
and the linguistic encoding, something uncommon in spoken languages.  
In the following chapters, I use Relevance Theory concepts to describe my 
hypothesis regarding the role of resemblance in human communication.  
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CHAPTER 3  
RESEMBLANCE-ORIENTED COMMUNICATION 
The goal in this chapter is to present my theory of resemblance-oriented 
communication from a Relevance Theory perspective. I describe the importance of 
inference in resemblance, the interaction between inference and conventionalization, and 
describe the function of resemblance in human communication. 
3.1 Inference and resemblance  
Wilson and Sperber present inference in the following way (Wilson & Sperber 
2012:101–102): 
“the communicator produces a piece of evidence of her 
meaning – the ostensive stimulus – and the addressee infers 
her meaning from this piece of evidence. Verbal 
communication is always context-sensitive and inferential.” 
Essentially, Relevance Theory defines inference as the process by which addressees, 
given evidence through ostensive communication, make the desired connections between 
the item or items of evidence and arrive at the communicator’s meaning. The way that 
these connections are chosen is by following the relevance theoretic comprehension 
heuristic, “(i) considering possible cognitive effects in their order of accessibility (i.e., 
following a path of least effort); and (ii) stopping when the expected level of relevance is 
achieved (or appears unachievable)” (Wilson & Sperber 2012:7). According to Relevance 
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Theory, a wide range of ostensive acts can be used as evidence of the communicator’s 
intent. Wilson and Sperber (2012:36) give the following example, which makes use of 
resemblance:  
“Peter asks Mary if she wants to go to the cinema. Mary 
half-closes her eyes and mimes a yawn. This is a piece of 
ostensive behaviour. Peter recognises it as such and infers, 
non-demonstratively, that Mary is tired, that she wants to 
rest, and that therefore she does not want to go to the 
cinema.”  
In this example, the addressee (Peter) must assume that Mary’s act of communication is 
relevant to him. Wilson and Sperber (ibid) go on to suggest that Mary’s yawn activated 
the concept “tired” in Peter’s mind, providing a starting point for inference. Without 
inference, Peter would never be able to understand Mary’s attempt at communication.  
Like all acts of ostensive communication, resemblance-oriented communication is 
dependent on inference. Demonstrated by Mary’s attempt at communication, acts of  
resemblance-oriented communication (stimuli) leverage visual or aural similarity 
between real-world targets (such as yawns) and intended thoughts (tiredness, a mental 
representation in Peter’s mind) to provide starting points for the inferential process.  
Inference is not the only process by which addresses understand an utterance. 
Relevance Theory proposes that the processing effort required to understand an utterance 
must be low enough to make it worth the addressee’s effort. To that end, communicators 
will individually tailor utterances to achieve relevance for the addressee, taking shared 
context (everything the communicator and addressee knows) into account. One of the key 
18 
 
factors in lowering processing effort is conventionalization, which I discuss in the next 
section.  
3.2 Convention and inference     
While Relevance Theory proposes that most or all of human communication 
involves some use of inference, conventionalization has a role to play as well. 
Conventionalization is the standardization of a word, gesture, head shake, sound, or any 
other stimulus, by common use and unsaid or explicit agreement. Essentially, 
conventionalized words or signs function to provide starting points for inference. To 
continue with Mary’s example above, she could just have easily (or perhaps more easily) 
told Peter (using language) that she was tired, providing Peter with a very clear starting 
point from which he could infer her meaning and saving him processing effort.  
To understand the role resemblance plays in human communication, it is important 
to consider the effect of conventionalization on processing effort. In Table 2 below, I 
chart the impacts of convention and inference on cognitive effects and processing effort.  
 
Table 2. The interaction between cognitive effects, processing effort, inference, and 
conventionalization.   
Cognitive effects  Processing effort  
Inferential communication allows 
for vast amounts of cognitive 
benefits, limited only by the 
expectation of relevance. 
Addressee’s can understand a 
speaker’s meaning even when a 
great deal of inference is required.  
Conventionalization serves to 
reduce processing effort. 
Conventions act as highly 
accessible anchors for inference; 
essentially serving as starting 
points for the relevance theory 
comprehension heuristic. 
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In this table, the conventionalization of codes allows an addressee to activate concepts 
that are similar to the communicator’s intended thought. For example, if Mary had used 
the word tired instead of miming a yawn, Peter would have been able to quickly access 
his experience of tiredness, and by following the Relevance Theory comprehension 
procedure, pick out the aspects of tiredness which are optimally relevant, and follow a 
process of inference to arrive at Mary’s intended meaning. 
3.3 The role of resemblance in human communication 
The primary claim of this thesis is that resemblance, like convention, functions as a 
bridge between communicators and acts as evidence of a speaker or signers intended 
thought. Visual or aural stimuli which look like or sound like the objects or concepts they 
are meant to communicate act as highly accessible starting points from which inference 
can proceed; for example, Peter sees Mary’s yawn, which resembles a real yawn and fits 
with Peter’s knowledge about yawns; the concept of tiredness will now be highly 
accessible to him (since yawns often indicate someone is tired) and require little 
processing effort. In this model, the range of human perception and experience acts as 
common ground, providing a shared context between communicator and addressee. This 
shared context can include knowledge about the world and how it works, in areas such as 
physics, spatial relationships, size, shape, human function and behavior, and more. 
Pantomime is an ideal example of this; when a person is travelling abroad in a country 
where he or she does not know the native language, a common way to ask for a drink 
would be to point the water source and mimic the act of taking a drink. The mechanism 
which allows this to be understood is resemblance.  
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In the following two chapters, I introduce examples of resemblance in both spoken 
and signed languages.  
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CHAPTER 4  
RESEMBLANCE IN SPOKEN LANGUAGE 
Examples of resemblance-oriented communication occur frequently in spoken 
languages. Ideophones, constructions which aurally imitate the real world through 
onomatopoeia, vowel lengthening, reduplication, etc. are all possible examples of 
resemblance in which the similarity between the sign and the signified is based on sound 
(Lydall et al. 2000). Simple examples of resemblance in ideophones in English include 
sound words like a dog’s bark or duck’s quack in which the words resemble the sound 
(albeit rather abstractly), and vowel lengthening in which great distance or time is 
conveyed by the modification of words such as long, as in “it was a loooong trip.” 
Interjections such as ouch are also possible examples of resemblance. The International 
Symposium on Ideophones concluded “that ideophones and similar words have a special 
dramaturgic function that differs from all other word classes: Ideophones simulate an 
event, an emotion, a perception through language” (Voeltz & Killian-Hatz 2001:3).  
In describing the arbitrary nature of language, Saussure dismisses onomatopoeia and 
interjections with only cursory attention. He makes the claim that in many cases the 
resemblance between sign and signified is merely coincidental. Additionally, he makes 
the following argument, claiming that resemblance eventually fades over time (Saussure 
1959:69): 
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“As for authentic onomatopoeic words (e.g. glug-glug, tick-
tock, etc.) not only are they limited in number, but also they 
are chosen somewhat arbitrarily, for they are only 
approximate and more or less conventional imitations of 
certain sounds (c. English bow-wow and French ouaoua). 
In addition, once these words have been subjected to the 
same evolution—phonetic, morphological, etc.—that other 
words undergo (cf. pigeon, ultimately from the Vulgar 
Latin pipio, derived in turn from an onomatopoeic 
formation: obvious proof that they lose something of their 
original character in order to assume that of the linguistic 
sign in general, which is unmotivated.” 
Saussure is working from the traditional code model of communication, which does not 
take inference into account; under the inferential model, any ostensive stimulus may be 
used as evidence of the speaker’s intent, including the resemblance of onomatopoeic 
words. Regardless of the small role resemblance may play in lexicons of spoken 
languages, I suggest that resemblance is present and was certainly a motivating factor in 
the creation of some words. Saussure also argues that onomatopoeic words become more 
arbitrary as they are conventionalized, which from a Relevance Theory perspective 
makes sense, since the role of convention in communication is to reduce processing 
effort. The value placed on low processing effort does not preclude the use of 
resemblance, but in some situations it may override it.  
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Not all examples of resemblance in spoken languages are linguistic, however; 
pointing is a strong example of the use of resemblance in communication. Spoken 
languages often use pointing to instruct an addressee to pick out a target. In English, 
procedural words such as this and that are used in conjunction with pointing; in these 
situations, pointing acts as a visual cue in which the intended thought is conflated with or 
strongly similar to the object pointed to. Essentially, the speaker is indicating a target, 
and expecting the addressee to use that target in a particular thought. In this case, the 
pointing gesture itself does not resemble either the object or the thought, but it does 
procedurally instruct the addressee that there is a strong resemblance (in many cases 
direct, one-to-one resemblance) between the target and the intended thought. Because of 
this, the target is highly accessible to the addressee and requires practically no 
disambiguation, providing a very strong starting point for inference. This is especially 
useful in cases where referent disambiguation is important, say in a room with lots of 
chairs; pointing makes disambiguation easier, reducing both production time for the 
speaker and processing effort for the addressee. Consider the following two examples:  
1. The tall, brown chair in the corner is broken.  
Given a situation in which there are several chairs in the corner, a number of which are 
either tall or brown, the addressee must access encyclopedic entries for chairs, corners, 
and the color brown. The correct chair is identified as the target. Only then can the rest of 
the proposition be understood, that the target chair is broken.  
2. That chair is broken. (accompanied by pointing) 
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Given the same situation, the speaker’s pointing clearly instructs the addressee to pick out 
the correct target. The proposition can then be completed using only the optimally 
relevant details of the chair.  
Essentially, when using pointing, the speaker is presenting the addressee with a 
highly unambiguous target and a wealth of possible paths for inference. Relevance theory 
explains how this is possible: by choosing the path of least effort and stopping when 
optimal relevance is achieved.   
Another example of resemblance-oriented communication is the use of gesture. In 
the following example sentence, a gesture in combination with a spoken language 
utterance makes use of resemblance.  
Example 2. Spoken language and gesture. 
John is this tall.  
 
This example, without an accompanying gesture or clear target from context, would 
generally be considered meaningless or at least unclear; however, when the speaker holds 
their hand at about John’s height, it becomes apparent to the addressee that they are 
expected to equate the height of the speaker’s hand with the height of John. The 
demonstrative this is conventional and procedural; it contains no information about 
height, just instructions to pick out a target in the same way pointing does. The adjective 
tall is entirely dependent on the context; tall can be used to describe a tall skyscraper or a 
tall chair. The process which allows the speaker to understand the utterance in this 
example is inference; this instructs the addressee to pick out a target (the speaker’s hand) 
and tall instructs the addressee which quality of John to compare (using resemblance) to 
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that target. Essentially, the addressee understands John’s height through analogy, 
inferring the intended meaning by comparing their mental representation of John with the 
resemblance of John’s height demonstrated by the gesture. The hand gesture resembles 
one characteristic of John, and the addressee understands the speaker’s meaning by way 
of analogy.  
Gestures in spoken language often make use of visual cues which aid in inferential 
processing, even when highly conventionalized alternatives are available. Gestures in 
spoken language seem to be especially common when referring to size, describing 
actions, reporting speech and emotions, and other situations where visual examples are 
more accessible for inferential enrichment than their conventionalized counterparts. The 
following sentences are possible alternatives to “John is this tall.”  
1. John is six feet, three inches tall.  
In many situations, John’s exact height is probably not relevant; according to relevance 
theory, the speaker should only include evidence which will be optimally relevant to the 
addressee; additional detail can easily lead to excessive processing effort, non-optimal 
relevance, and miscommunication. The purpose of this statement is to state a detailed 
fact; possible situations where this utterance might be appropriate include a medical chart 
or taking measurements for a tailor.  
2. John is taller than Melissa.  
This utterance might be appropriate when describing John, but is only useful in that it 
compares John with something or someone else. Functionally, it is performing the same 
purpose as “John is this tall” combined with a gesture, but instead of using gesture to 
resemble John’s height, the speaker is using Melissa’s height as the target. This requires 
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Melissa to be present, however, or requires the addressee to be familiar with her. Gesture, 
though, can be used without the presence of another similar target (such as another 
person to compare), and can easily be approximated so that only the level of detail 
relevant is given.  
3. John is tall.  
In this utterance, the only relevant detail is that John is taller than some average left to be 
inferred by the addressee. Optimal relevance would be achieved only when the addressee 
picks out an average which is relevant to the context. This is why the English word tall 
can be used to describe a chair or a skyscraper. In many cases, gesture may be 
inappropriate here because it would be providing more detail than is optimally relevant.  
Each of these phrases is used in different situations and present slightly different 
explicatures. In the first, John’s height is exactly similar to six feet, three inches. In the 
second, John’s height is similar to Melissa’s, but is procedurally constrained by taller 
than to indicate how his height differs from hers. In the third, John’s height is compared 
to an average, determined by relevance. Only in the case of “John is this tall” is the 
gesture used; this utterance would be chosen when an approximation of John’s height is 
optimally relevant. Essentially, “John is this tall” combined with a gesture is an example 
of a situation in which resemblance is more relevant than a series of conventional 
alternatives, because it provides cognitive benefits with optimal processing effort.  
 Another example of resemblance in spoken language is the use of quotation, which 
can range from direct quotation (essentially literal imitation of another utterance), to 
loose quotation (the paraphrasing of another utterance), to echoic use (which conveys 
attitudes by modifying quotations) (Wilson & Sperber 2012:230–258). Resemblance 
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between the quotation and the thought intended varies depending on the literalness of the 
quotation, but without the presence of resemblance, quotation would not be possible. 
Ultimately, the ability to see the resemblance between any two assumptions, propositions, 
objects, etc. is dependent on the human ability of metarepresentation. Metarepresentation 
allows humans to discuss utterances or thoughts, or the thoughts of others.  
Situations regularly occur in spoken languages where optimal relevance is achieved 
more economically using resemblance-oriented communication than arbitrary, 
conventional words, but I do not claim that gesture is always more economical. In many 
cases, resemblance-oriented communication requires greater processing effort because of 
its lack of conventionalization; however, to dismiss the presence and frequent use of 
resemblance in onomatopoeic words, interjections, pointing, gesture, and quotation 
ignores a common strategy used in human communication.  
In the following chapter, I discuss the presence of resemblance in signed languages.  
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CHAPTER 5  
RESEMBLANCE IN SIGNED LANGUAGES  
As I have mentioned in previous chapters, both spoken and signed languages make 
use of resemblance in communication. Signed languages, because of their visual 
modality, make use of this principle in a range of ways unavailable to spoken languages. 
In this chapter, my goal is to describe some important strategies of signed languages 
which make this possible, including the use of space, continuous encoding, indexing, and 
directionality. I also examine supporting evidence of resemblance in signed languages, 
including the high degree of lexical similarity between unrelated signed languages, 
iconicity, the rate of signing vs. speaking, and deaf culture and experience.  
5.1 General principles of resemblance evident in signed languages 
In signed languages, there are several general communication strategies which make 
use of resemblance. Since each of these strategies is used in several constructions, I deal 
with them in general here, and give examples of specific uses in later sections.  
5.1.1 Use of space 
Sign languages make use of space in a number of ways—some of which are entirely 
arbitrary, but many which are not. Because the articulators are operating in three-
dimensional space, just as many of the objects language describes are, there is an inherent 
opportunity for imitation of objects in that environment. This is functionally similar to 
onomatopoeia in spoken languages. On the same principle, sign languages form lexical 
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items, constructions, referring expressions, and more in the same space as the objects 
they encode. Essentially, many structures in signed languages are imitative of location or 
movement in the real world. I propose that signed languages use the resemblance 
between the signs (linguistic constructions) and the signified (what the sign stands for) to 
procedurally instruct addressees to manipulate concepts as they are presented in the 
language. In essence, signers are showing addressees how to manipulate concepts using a 
linguistically structured system based on resemblance to the real world. In this system, 
concepts can be introduced lexically, positioned in space procedurally, and understood 
through context-enriched inference based on resemblance.  
5.1.2 Continuous encoding  
Signed languages show evidence of continuous encoding in several areas. I use the 
term “continuous encoding” to refer to a high or non-finite number of meaningful 
distinctions made by a linguistic system. This is most evident when describing size, 
shape, distance, or other spatial situations. For example, when describing the size of an 
object, a signer can hold their hands an appropriate distance apart, showing by the 
position of their hands how big the object is. There is no linguistically-mandated set of 
positions at which a signer can place their hands; a sign can be adjusted to match the size 
of any object, limited only by the physical constraints of the human body, and even these 
limits can be overcome by the use of scale. This non-finite number of sizes, instead of 
being arbitrary lexical items, are instead mimetic examples of resemblance, in which 
positioning and distance between the hands resembles the size, shape, or other 
characteristics of the object being described. Signs can also be modified in their 
movement, location, or direction to physically recreate, in varying scales, situations in the 
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real world or imaginary space. Because the real world is infinitely variable, the changes 
in the language are equally variable; for instance, I can produce the lexical sign for house 
and simulate the position of several real-world houses in the signing space. The location 
in which I place each house is not lexically determined but correlates with the relative 
position of the houses in the real world (or in the hypothetical proposition I wish to 
communicate). Essentially, the location in signing space where I place each house is 
determined by resemblance. If these locations were lexical, this would result in a non-
finite number of constructions which must be added to the lexicon, presenting a difficulty 
for the traditional understanding of languages as arbitrary. Instead, I propose that this 
phenomenon is actually an example of the structured use of inferential communication, 
constrained by several different linguistic elements but ultimately inseparable from 
resemblance. Continuous constructions of this kind occur in a number of signed language 
constructions, and I deal with individual examples in later sections. In the next section, I 
discuss use of resemblance in indexing.  
5.1.3 Concrete and abstract indexing  
Indexing, or the grammatical use of pointing, is common in signed languages and is 
a key example of a resemblance-oriented communication strategy. For the purposes of 
this thesis, I divide indexing into two categories: concrete and abstract. In both cases, 
indexing is primarily used procedurally to instruct the addressee to pick out a target 
which the intended thought resembles. 
Concrete indexing occurs when a signer points to a person, object, location, or other 
target in the immediate physical context. This occurs often in spoken language as well, 
such as when giving directions or disambiguating targets. In many cases, indexing 
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accompanies a noun phrase or description of the object, which helps to limit the possible 
targets of the index.  
I propose that concrete indexing is functionally the same in spoken languages and 
sign languages: it is used primarily to instruct the addressee to pick out a target. Below, I 
give an example of concrete indexing functioning procedurally:  
1. The signer and addressee share a physical context; for this example,  a room full 
of cats.  
2. The signer produces the lexical sign for CAT. 
3. The signer points to a specific cat, then signs a proposition about the cat (it looks 
hungry, it is the biggest, it is the signer’s favorite, etc.).  
4. The addressee processes the conceptual encoding for cat.  
5. The index procedurally instructs the addressee to pick out the target based on the 
real world and use it in the proposition.  
6. The addressee’s thought is now a mental representation of the real world cat and 
should be similar to the signer’s mental representation. This provides a controlled 
context. Furthermore, the addressee can now choose whatever characteristics of 
the cat are optimally relevant, given the rest of the proposition.  
The conceptually encoded sign CAT and the procedurally encoded, visually motivated 
index are used in combination to create an utterance which is highly accessible from 
context, unambiguous, and economical. When compared with an example from either 
spoken or signed language which does not include indexing, the economic advantages of 
concrete indexing is clear; much less detail is needed when pointing than when relying on 
description alone. While languages have a multitude of ways to perform all of the above 
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target identification without indexing, they rarely do so as economically as in the above 
example.  
Abstract indexing occurs when a signer points to indicate a target which is not 
physically present. This commonly occurs when indicating a location or target in three-
dimensional signing space and when pointing to a referring location in the signing space. 
I deal with this more thoroughly in later sections, but essentially, abstract indexing 
functions like concrete indexing except that it encodes procedural instructions to pick out 
a relevant target from mental or signing space context, instead of the physically present, 
real-world context.  
5.1.4 Directionality 
Directionality is also used in several areas of signed language structure, from 
pronouns to discourse marking to what has been analyzed as verb agreement. 
Directionality can be seen as the mapping of signed constructions onto both real world 
directions as well as signing space constructions, in which a signer recreates a real world 
situation and indicates direction within that representation. Because directionality is 
mapped onto the real world, it can be both continuous and non-finite. I propose that 
directional constructions procedurally instruct the addressee to pick out directions, and 
often subjects and objects, in the real world or signing space.  
In the following section, I introduce supporting evidence of the use of resemblance 
in signed languages.  
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5.2 Supporting evidence of resemblance in signed languages 
In addition to the general strategies used above, there is substantial evidence that 
resemblance plays a large role in signed languages. In the following sections, I examine 
supporting evidence of resemblance including the high degree of lexical similarity 
between unrelated signed languages, the presence of iconicity, the rate of signing vs. 
speaking, and deaf culture and experience.  
5.2.1 Lexical similarity  
A major difference between signed and spoken languages is the degree of lexical 
similarity between unrelated languages. Unrelated signed languages tend to be more 
similar than unrelated spoken languages. While less data on lexical similarity is available 
for signed languages than for spoken languages, some data has been made available 
through lexicostatistical analysis.  
Lexicostatistics is a commonly used linguistic tool for evaluating unwritten or under-
documented languages, such as is regularly the case with sign languages (Woodward 
2011). Woodward, in his 2011 article, outlines the history of lexicostatistics as applied to 
sign languages. Lexicostatistics has been traditionally used as a tool for historical 
linguistics, both to trace the ancestry of a given language and to identify language 
families. Core vocabulary from each language is collected and then compared, using a 
cognate identification method in which a word in one language is compared to a word in 
another language. If any differences in the words appear, the linguist tries to explain 
those differences using phonological rules such as assimilation, deletion, etc. and if they 
are successful, that word pair is considered a cognate (Woodward 2011). Using this 
method with data collected from Costa Rica, Woodward conducted two different studies: 
34 
 
one using the traditional Swadesh (1951) wordlist, and one using a modified wordlist to 
reduce the number of iconic signs. When using the traditional Swadesh word list, 
Woodward found that the unrelated sign languages scored between 36% and 47% lexical 
similarity. He attributed the extremely high scores to the word list itself, pointing out that 
a number of items were signed by pointing to the object (a body part, for example) or 
some other visually rich method, claiming that this created false cognates, inflating the 
languages’ lexical similarity scores. Using a modified word list to reduce the number of 
iconic signs, he found that unrelated sign languages showed much lower lexical 
similarity, varying from 7% to 27%.  
 I was able to reproduce Woodward’s results using an alternative to counting cognates, 
developed by Parks (2011), using a slightly different word list. Parks’ method consists of 
counting each of four parameters for every sign in the word list: initial and final 
handshape, and initial and final location, then averaging those scores to produce lexical 
similarity scores for each wordlist pair (Parks 2011).  Using word lists from signed 
languages of Ecuador, Romania, Italy, and Portugal, I was able to produce baseline 
lexical similarity scores for unrelated sign languages at between 10% and 17% lexical 
similarity, corroborating Woodward’s numbers with samples from a much broader 
geographical range. See the Table 3. Lexical similarity variance using different word lists 
– most lexically similar unrelated languages. below for a summary of these 
lexicostatistical findings.  
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Table 3. Lexical similarity variance using different word lists – most lexically similar 
unrelated languages.  
 
In the above chart, the solid bars indicate the highest percentage of lexical similarity 
found between unrelated languages using each wordlist. The lexicostatistical analysis 
using wordlists with fewer easily iconized items results in lower lexical similarity, 
suggesting that iconicity plays a major role in sign language similarity.  
Woodward claimed that using the traditional wordlist made the lexicostatistical data 
from that wordlist inappropriate for historical linguistics, but it does help to explain an 
important factor in cross-linguistic sign language communication: that large swaths of 
sign language lexicons make use of indexing, body parts, mime, and other forms of 
iconicity to form their vocabulary, increasing the amount of lexical similarity even 
between unrelated languages. 
High rates of lexical similarity among sign languages may be dismissed as instances 
of gesture and not individual words, as has been the common perception of sign 
Percent Similar 
Percent Similar 
Percent Similar 
Percent Different 
Percent Different 
Percent Different 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Parks word list - Eberle - low iconic
content
Modified word list - Woodward - low
iconic content
Swadesh word list -Woodward - high
iconic content
Parks word list - Eberle -
low iconic content
Modified word list -
Woodward - low iconic
content
Swadesh word list -
Woodward - high iconic
content
Percent Similar 17 27 47
Percent Different 83 63 53
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languages for much of history; however, the work of Stokoe (1960) and many other 
linguists have soundly put this view to rest. Researchers have gone to great lengths to 
distinguish sign language from gesture by enumerating the numerous structural and 
grammatical features they share with spoken languages.  
I suggest that the high degrees of lexical similarity between unrelated signed 
languages is due to the presence of resemblance in the lexicons of those signed 
languages, a phenomenon referred to in the literature on signed languages as iconicity.  
Parkhurst and Parkhurst (2003), in a lexicostatistics study of signed languages in 
Europe, found that four unrelated signed languages from Spain, Northern Ireland, Finland, 
and Bulgaria all had identical signs for the concept “book”. While Parkhurst and Parkhurst 
(2003) suggest the possibility that these signs are all borrowed from the same language or 
all four languages are descended from a common ancestor, I argue that it is far more likely 
that the motivation behind all of these signs is resemblance, and that the common tie 
between them is human perception. Additionally, Parkhurst and Parkhurst’s findings stand 
as evidence against Saussure’s claim that onomatopoetic words, which are functionally 
similar to iconic signs in signed languages, “are chosen somewhat arbitrarily, for they are 
only approximate and more or less conventional imitations of certain sounds” (Saussure 
1959:69). It seems unlikely that four unrelated languages (and potentially many more) 
with no known historical ties “somewhat arbitrarily” chose the same sign to represent the 
concept “book.” 
Lexicostatistical research has shown that sign language lexicons overlap in areas such 
as body parts, pronouns, or indexing; these, too, I argue are resemblance-oriented. Since 
human cognition tends to be geared toward a maximization of relevance, it follows that 
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signed languages would take advantage of iconicity. Pointing to one’s body to indicate a 
body part is an excellent example of an efficient communication strategy because the 
processing effort on the hearer’s part is low. All of the arbitrariness of the English word 
for  the concept “arm” is eliminated from the communication process, leaving only the 
gestural evidence for the concept “arm,” which can be easily accessed even by users of 
other sign languages (or even, perhaps, non-signers). I discuss iconicity in depth in the 
following section. 
5.2.2 Iconicity 
Iconicity is a common term in sign language linguistics which refers to how a sign in 
some way visually demonstrates the concept it is represents. For instance, as Mandel 
(1977) points out, the American Sign Language (ASL) sign for the concept “house” 
visually duplicates the outline of a prototypical American house, with a pointed roof and 
straight sides. As with lexical similarity, some might argue that this resembles gesture 
more closely than a lexical word; however, to make such an argument, one must draw a 
line where gesture stops and signs begin. As Mandel points out, iconicity forms a 
continuum between the arbitrary lexical sign and the iconic one. He gives the example of 
the ASL sign BLACK, in which an index finger is drawn across the forehead, as one 
which bears no significant evidence of iconicity. His next example is HOUSE, mentioned 
above, as tracing an outline of the target. Moving along the continuum towards the 
iconic, he describes the sign for FOLLOW, in which one hand literally follows the other 
motion for motion. Finally, he describes signs which directly mimic actions closely 
associated with the target, such as BASEBALL, in which the signer mimes the hefting of 
a baseball bat over their shoulder, culminating in what he claims is a purely iconic 
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example in which a signer describes the action of looking down at one’s hand by doing 
just that.  
Despite the clear presence of iconicity in the lexicons of signed languages, linguists 
have been able to show that over time, signs which at one point were iconic and gestural 
become standardized over time, conforming to phonological and grammatical rules of the 
language (Frishberg 1979). Though these rules may often vary slightly from language to 
language, many are the same; for instance, it is uncommon to have signs in which both 
hands are moving and the dominant and non-dominant hands are performing motions 
which are not either mirrored or opposite of each other. Over time, even the most iconic 
gestures can conform to the phonological rules of a language, such as conventionalized 
handshapes. Occasionally, this can result in the sign losing some or all of its iconicity, but 
there are many constructions which remain iconic yet conform fully to the language’s 
rules. According to Relevance Theory, this is to be expected; human communication 
seeks an optimal balance between cognitive effects and processing effort. Since 
conventionalization reduces processing effort, it should come as no surprise that gestural 
and pantomimic constructions will conform to language rules over time. I suggest that the 
degree to which they retain their iconicity and resemblance is a function of cost/benefit 
ratio between the benefits of resemblance and the cost in processing effort.  
While the exact details of how iconic utterances are interpreted is beyond the scope 
of this thesis, I do have a hypothesis: that the visual similarity between the utterance and 
the intended thought activates general concepts in the mind of the addressee, much the 
same as with a lexical item. Following a process of enrichment and the relevance 
theoretic comprehension procedure, addressees can arrive at cognitive benefits. 
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Additionally, the presence of visually motivated movements and handshapes constrains 
the possible interpretations produced by this process, limiting the potential interpretations 
while providing additional clues about size, manner, speed, etc.   
The impact of resemblance is difficult to measure, primarily because of the often 
intangible nature of processing effort. Because humans are capable of processing highly 
complex information quickly, the difference between an utterance with high processing 
effort and one with low processing effort is hard to quantify. Ultimately, the visual 
modality offers more ways to express resemblance than the aural modality. Because of 
this, the presence of resemblance is magnified in signed languages, which accounts for 
the frequent use of iconicity. Another difference between spoken and signed language is 
the rate of production, which I discuss in the following section.   
5.2.3  Rates of signing and speaking 
A key difference between spoken and signed languages is the rate of production.  
Klima and Bellugi (1979) conducted a study comparing the production rates of spoken 
English with ASL. Their data showed a drastic difference in rates of articulation between 
English and American Sign Language; they concluded that the average number of signs 
produced per second was approximately half the average number of words produced per 
second, as shown in Table 4. Mean words per second (spoken English) vs. mean signs per 
second (ASL) Reproduced from (Klima & Bellugi 1979) below.     
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Table 4. Mean words per second (spoken English) vs. mean signs per second (ASL) 
Reproduced from (Klima & Bellugi 1979) 
 Mean words per second Mean signs per second 
Subject A 4.0 2.3 
Subject B 4.9 2.3 
Subject C 5.2 2.5 
 
Given the mode of articulation, the drastic difference in signing speed might not seem to 
be surprising or significant. Sign language articulators themselves are larger and less 
nimble than spoken language articulators, and signs require much larger motions of the 
articulators than spoken languages (Klima & Bellugi 1979). Despite this difference in 
articulation rate, Klima and Bellugi found that the rate at which complete propositions 
were produced was roughly one-to-one: in short, signers were communicating the same 
story at half the rate but with twice the information content. Klima and Bellugi (1979) 
went on to propose their own theories for the difference in rate of articulation, listing the 
following strategies used by signed languages:  
 The structured use of space 
 The superimposed modulations of the movement of signs  
 The simultaneous use of facial expressions for grammatical purposes.  
I suggest that the first and second strategies, and in certain situations the third, make use 
of resemblance, and are present in a variety of signed language communication strategies 
discussed in later sections. In the next section, I discuss another factor which contributes 
to the use of resemblance: deaf experience.  
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5.2.4 Deaf culture and experience 
Another factor which may impact the use of resemblance is deaf experience. Deaf 
cultures around the world have many characteristics in common, often including means 
of getting attention, directness of speech, high valuation of shared information, 
challenges communicating with hearing communities, and limited or no access to the 
aural modality. All of these characteristics create cultural similarities even across large 
geographical distances, foster an attitude of global community among sign language 
users, and provide a sense of shared cultural context amongst the deaf community. 
Additionally, levels of language skill among deaf communities vary greatly due to factors 
such as age of language acquisition, age of hearing loss, pressure to use a spoken 
language, and more, all of which make for a highly diverse spectrum of language ability. 
This results in signers having more experience communicating with addressees of 
varying fluency. Any and all of these characteristics could contribute to the additional use 
of resemblance in communication, since so many factors can impact what is optimally 
relevant for an addressee. In the next chapter, I examine in brief individual uses of 
resemblance in signed languages.  
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CHAPTER 6  
EXAMPLES OF RESEMBLANCE IN SIGNED LANGUAGES 
In this chapter I provide concrete examples of how signed languages make use of 
resemblance, including pronouns, role shift, classifier constructions, locatives, and facial 
expression.  
6.1 Resemblance in Pronouns  
Relevance theory treats pronouns as procedural indicators which instruct the 
addressee to pick out a referent. Essentially, pronouns in signed languages function the 
same way. One major difference between signed and spoken languages is the use of 
locations in the signing space, commonly termed loci, to refer to objects or people. In the 
vast majority of sign languages described in the literature, pronoun function “can be 
described as indexical pointing to locations that represent referents” (Lillo-Martin 
2002:241–262). These locations can be used to refer to first, second, or third person, and 
can include number as well. There have been two major difficulties in analyzing these 
constructions, however: first, that referent loci are not limited to a discrete set of locations 
(Lillo-Martin 2002). This poses difficulties best described by Liddell (1995:24–25):  
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“There appears to be an unlimited number of possible 
locations for referents in Real Space and, correspondingly, 
an unlimited number of possible locations toward which the 
hand may be directed. Attempting a morphemic solution to 
the problem of directing signs toward any of an unlimited 
number of possible locations in Real Space would require 
an unlimited number of location and direction morphemes 
or it would require postulating a single morpheme whose 
form was indeterminate.”  
The second obstacle to a clear-cut analysis of pronouns is, as Lillo-Martin (2002:245) 
points out, that “pointing to the location of a referent picks out that referent, not a class of 
potential referents (such as third person males).” Pronouns in signed languages perform 
all of the same functions as spoken languages, but the manner in which they instruct 
addressees to pick out referents relies less on class words, like he, which indicates 
singular third person male, and more on pointing and resemblance to assign referents to 
pronominal constructions. In the following sections, I compare the differences between 
spoken and signed language pronouns and explain them from a relevance theory 
perspective. 
6.1.1 First and second person and physically present identification of referents 
Both spoken and signed languages have ways to refer to the first- and second- person 
in a conversation. Spoken languages use arbitrary words (or other systems, such as verb 
agreement) to instruct the addressee to pick out the speaker or addressee as referent. In 
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these cases, the procedural instructions are highly explicit in instructing the hearer to pick 
out the referent for the speaker or the addressee.  
Sign languages, on the other hand, use indexing (pointing) in place of arbitrary words. 
Indexing functions as a highly unambiguous method of distinguishing possible referents, 
especially when it is not clear who the second person is (such as when speaking to 
someone in a group). Signed language pronouns are essentially pointing and provide 
instructions roughly equivalent to “pick out the target of the index as referent.” Much of 
the time, pointing is used in spoken language the same way, when a speaker wants to 
address a member of a group or crowd whose name the speaker does not know.  
Regarding Liddell’s problem stated above, that there is an unlimited number of 
possible locations for referents that cannot be accounted for in the lexicon, I suggest that 
pointing is a valid example of ostensive information which acts as evidence of the 
communicator’s intent. The difficulty which underlies pointing being accounted for in a 
lexicon suggests that it functions on the fly, leveraging resemblance in combination with 
the Relevance Theory comprehension procedure.  
6.1.2 Third person identification of referents 
Third person pronouns in both signed and spoken language provide procedural 
instructions to pick out the referent, even when the target is physically absent. Spoken 
languages typically limit the possible referents of a pronoun using context (from earlier in 
the discourse or otherwise) by means of the relevance theoretic comprehension procedure 
(if a particular referent does not seem relevant, it probably is not the one the speaker 
means). See Example 3. Pronouns in spoken language.  
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Example 3. Pronouns in spoken language.  
John went to the store. He bought milk. 
 
In this example, John is introduced in the first sentence, making him an easily accessible 
referent in the second sentence. The possibilities are further narrowed through the 
pronoun he, which includes classification for third person, singular and male. While sign 
languages use context as well, the pronoun contains no narrowing of possible referents by 
category except number and person; instead, unambiguous referent identification is 
performed through association with a location (by means of pointing at the time of 
introduction). The location itself is an ad-hoc construction which is associated with the 
referent on the fly. Here I give an example of a typical utterance using a pronoun. 
 
1. The signer produces a conceptually encoded sign, which could be a name or a 
noun, or a description, while looking in the general direction of where the locus 
will be placed.  
2. The signer points to the locus. This establishes where that person or entity will be 
referred to for the rest of the utterance (or longer, possibly the entire discourse). 
From an RT perspective, this can be considered a set of procedurally encoded 
instructions to logically associate a character with that locus.  
3. The signer can then add additional characters in the same manner.  
4. For the rest of the exchange, the signer can refer to any character previously set 
up simply by pointing to the associated locus.  
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Example 4. Pronoun reference through loci. Modified from Sandler & Lillo-Martin 
(2006:373) 
MARY-INDEX(A). JOHN-INDEX(B). INDEX(A)(Mary)-LOVE-INDEX(B)(John). 
Mary loves John.  
 
In this example, the signer signs Mary’s name and points to a location, associating that 
location with Mary. She then signs John’s name and points to another location, 
associating it with John. Finally, the signer points to the location associated with Mary, 
signs the lexical sign for love, and points to the location associated with John. Mary and 
John are associated with loci upon introduction. The locus itself then refers 
unambiguously to the character later in the discourse; the signer points to the locus when 
they want to refer to the associated referent. For the addressee, the loci functions as a 
procedural indicator to pick out the associated person or location. The loci can remain 
throughout the discourse, so that the signer can refer to either John or Mary at any time.  
While both the spoken and signed examples above are procedural, signed languages leave 
less room for variance because the ad hoc locus association is more constraining, and 
therefore requires less processing effort.  
 In addition to the use of resemblance in pointing, I propose that the use of loci which 
are positioned relative to real world locations is evidence of resemblance. It is common 
for loci to be situated relative to where they were or are located in the real world, either 
from the speaker’s perspective or some other perspective. Using resemblance in this way 
is information rich and provides more guidance for inference. In the next section, I 
discuss the use of directionality of signs which interact with loci in the signing space.  
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6.1.3 Directionality, pronominals, and verb agreement 
At times, the location and direction in which a sign moves is critical to the meaning 
of the sign. See Example 5. Directionality in HELP below, communicated by a single 
sign in ASL: 
Example 5. Directionality in HELP 
  
I-HELP-YOU 
I am helping you. 
  
YOU-HELP-ME 
You are helping me. 
 
These phrases are signed identically except the initial and final location and direction of 
the movements are reversed. In the first example, the sign begins close to the signer’s 
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chest and moves toward the person being helped; in the second, the sign begins away 
from the chest, toward the second person, and moves back towards the signer’s chest. 
The direction of the movement shows the agent (the helper) and the object (the person 
being helped) (Sandler & Lillo-Martin 2006). The movement can also be modified to 
indicate first and third person, or two third persons. Directionality has often been 
analyzed as verb agreement, because direction of the movement of the verb, such as in 
HELP, changes to match the subject and object. The primary use of resemblance occurs 
in directionality; the movement of subject to object mimics the direction of the action 
(actor to patient, for example). Like pronouns in English, the construction communicates 
who is helping and who is being helped; however, the directionality and movement of the 
ASL sign HELP shows an extreme range of possible variation: standing in a large group 
of people, the signer can produce HELP relative to each other person in the group, with a 
non-finite number of combinations. Moreover, it can be used in the same manner 
between second and third person or between two third parties.  I propose that this 
grammatical use of signing space and directionality is an example of linguistically 
encoded resemblance in which the movement directions are not arbitrary. I outline a 
possible path of the communication process for these constructions below:  
1. The signer chooses the conceptually encoded verb, HELP. This verb has an 
encyclopedic entry.  
2. The signer chooses the start and end points of the sign, based on resemblance 
to the real world or hypothetical locations of subject and object. 
3. The addressee recognizes the conceptually encoded verb as HELP.   
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4. The addressee recognizes the context, specifically, the relative positions of 
the signer and addressee or associated locations.  
5. The addressee recognizes the directionality of the sign as imposing 
constraints on the explicatures; namely, who is helping and who is being 
helped.  
While directionality can perform a similar function as verb agreement, I suggest that 
when the interaction among directionality and loci, the non-finite number of possible 
targets, and the resemblance of motion present in the demonstration of subject and object 
are taken into consideration, the use of resemblance as evidence of the speaker’s meaning 
is more evident in signed languages than in spoken languages. In the next section, I 
examine the use of resemblance in role shift.  
6.1.4 Resemblance in role shift 
Role shift is a grammatical element present in several different sign languages which 
is used in discourse to show who is speaking or acting at a given time, or to cite reported 
speech (Winston 1999). Diane Lillo-Martin (1995) suggests role shift functions as a point 
of view predicate, performing the same function as the English word like, as in the 
sentence “Mom is like I’m busy!”. Relevance Theory would analyze this as a procedural 
marker, encouraging the creation of higher-level explicatures which signal the quotation 
of an utterance (“John said ‘go to the store’” as opposed to “Go to the store”). When 
using role shift, signers can dynamically change roles, shown by a rotating of the torso 
and shoulders, giving the appearance of alternately taking on both parts of a two-way 
conversation. When role shifting, signers imitate characteristics of each character, 
including facial expression, eye gaze, and head tilt (a short character looks up when 
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talking to a taller character). All of these strategies are essentially resemblance-oriented, 
but constrained by conventionalization. Moreover, role shift is an example of the use of 
metarepresentation (the representation of a representation, in this case the quoting of 
another utterance), in that signers are quoting, through the use of resemblance between 
their signing and the original or possible utterance of someone else. This resemblance can 
then be understood literally, figuratively, or otherwise, as is relevant.  
I propose that role shift is an example of the grammatical use of signing space which 
makes use of resemblance. Signers take on the roles in the narrative, grammatically 
indicating through shoulder movement and facing that the construction or actions should 
be attributed to some other target character or person, even if the target is the signer at 
another time or place. When role shifting is performed, the character being referred to 
must either be designated in advance or determined by context; role shifting by itself has 
no lexical value. Additionally, from a discourse perspective, role shift is a highly 
persistent means of referring to characters, and it is not uncommon for the characters to 
be mentioned only once in a story, then referred to by role shift for the rest of the 
narrative. I outline an example of process underlying role shift below:  
1. When the first character initially appears in the narrative, the signer 
introduces the character by name or description: a conceptually encoded 
entity, usually a person, but not always.  
2. When the second character first takes action or signs in the narrative, the 
signer introduces the character by name or description and assumes the torso 
and shoulder orientation which will represent that character for the rest of the 
narrative. The shoulder position and facing act as spatial placeholders for the 
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position from which that character will speak (and the location they will be 
addressed at) for the rest of the narrative. This is procedurally encoded to 
instruct the addressee to reserve that position and facing for utterances from 
and to that character.  
3. The addressee now has a mental map of the characters in the story. Each time 
the signer assumes the position and facing associated with a specific 
character, the addressee can infer that the signer’s words and actions 
performed there should be attributed to that character.  
4. The resemblance between the signer’s manner, facial expression, eye gaze, 
etc. allows for easily accessible anchors for inference; the addressee, given 
the target by introduction, can easily associate the signer’s actions with the 
target.   
The use of resemblance in role shift occurs in that the signer’s utterance, whether 
literal or figurative, visually simulates the actions and utterances of the character being 
represented. Much like reported speech and quotation in spoken language, the ability to 
represent the utterances of others is valuable. Signed languages, because of the visual 
modality, can also imitate the motion, location, facial expression, and pantomime of the 
utterance, providing rich resemblance between the utterance and its quotation.   
From a Relevance Theory perspective, the use of resemblance in this way is highly 
economical. Addressees can infer vast amounts of cognitive effects from the resemblance 
between the signer’s utterance and the quotation, while the conventionalization allows 
them to understand unambiguously who is being quoted (and often who the addressee of 
the original utterance was). Ultimately, the use of role shift in signed languages is 
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functionally similar to quotation in spoken languages, but leverages the modality to 
create highly accessible, visually rich constructions which make use of resemblance.  
6.2 Classifier constructions 
Classifier constructions are a common occurrence in sign languages, but they have 
proven a struggle for linguists to explain. Basically, they represent constructions in which 
some or all of the commonly recognized parameters of a sign, including motion, location, 
orientation, and handshape, can display resemblance. They have been analyzed in many 
different ways, three of which are summarized in the table below:  
Table 5. Analyses of classifier constructions 
Analysis and 
Author 
Explanation of classifiers 
Verbs of motion and 
location (Supalla 
1986) 
Classifiers “are composed of combinations of discrete 
morphemes…the morphological parameters are like those 
found in spoken languages…ASL and spoken languages 
differ, however, in two ways: in ASL, but not in spoken 
languages, each  of the morphemes is sometimes 
transparently (or translucently) related to its meaning and the 
morphemes tend to combine simultaneously rather than 
sequentially.”  
(Supalla 1986:182) 
Verbal classifiers 
and noun 
incorporation 
(Sandler & Lillo-
Martin 2006) 
Classifiers are basically similar to spoken language verbal 
classifier systems in which “nominal morphemes are attached 
to verbs in a particular sort of compounding, and the two 
together form a single word.” 
(Sandler & Lillo-Martin 2006:85) 
Indicating verbs 
(Liddell 2003) 
Liddell proposes that classifiers are depicting verbs and that 
they are “composed of lexically fixed features combined with 
additional meaningful, gradient aspects of form,” specifically, 
the signer “depicts the action or state simultaneously” with 
the lexical content of the verb. (Liddell 2003:269–270) 
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Most of these examinations of classifiers deal primarily with the morphological 
properties of classifier constructions; however, for the purpose of this thesis, I am 
primarily concerned with how classifiers function pragmatically—specifically, by 
leveraging resemblance.  
For the purposes of this thesis, I am choosing to follow the analysis of Jones 
(2012:77) who made the following claims about classifiers in signed languages:  
 “…classifiers encode procedural instructions to help the 
addressee pick out the intended referent for the procedural 
referring expressions…create ad hoc concepts through the 
use of inference, narrowing, and broadening...can only be 
understood once referent assignment has been made, and 
then the meaning of the motion and orientation of the 
constructions can be understood through a process of 
inference." 
Ultimately, I propose that resemblance acts as trigger for a concept, providing a starting 
point for the Relevance Theory comprehension procedure and inference; the resemblance 
between the signed construction, the real-world situation, and the intended thought is the 
basis for narrowing, broadening, and assigning referents. Essentially, resemblance is the 
foundation upon which classifier systems are based. The majority of classifier 
constructions use resemblance to real world motion, shape, size, orientation and location 
as a starting point for inference.   
Despite the somewhat diverse analyses, linguists generally recognize three types of 
classifier constructions present in sign languages: size and shape specifiers, entity 
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classifiers, and handling classifiers (Sandler & Lillo-Martin 2006). I will deal with each 
type individually in the following sections. My goal is not to fully explain classifier 
constructions; a great deal of literature has been produced on the topic already. Instead, I 
only give a brief introduction of the systems and explain how they make use of 
resemblance.  
6.2.1 Size and shape specifiers 
Size and shape specifiers are used to describe the size and/or shape of objects. In this 
type of classifier construction, signers visually reproduce, or outline, the object being 
described (Supalla 1986). These constructions are made up of lexical handshapes which 
each represent a relatively open class of sizes and /or shapes, and resemblance-driven 
movement. This combination procedurally instructs the addressee to pick out a target 
with physical properties that fit the construction based on resemblance, by means of 
relevance, and limited to the class provided by the lexical handshape, such as “tubular” 
“thin,” etc.  
I present some examples of size and shape specifiers below:  
Example 6. Size and Shape Specifiers 
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Thin, horizontal tubular object.  
  
Medium horizontal tubular object. 
  
Thick horizontal tubular object.  
In these examples, the handshape and the movement outline the size and shape of the 
object, which could be a pipe, log, rolled up rug, or any number of cylindrical objects. 
The exact nature of the object is understood through context, inference, or explicit 
introduction. In size and shape specifiers, the resemblance between the signs and the 
target is quite strong. While the handshapes are at least partially conventionalized to refer 
to specific classes of characteristics, it is clear that handshapes, movements, orientation, 
and locations of size and shape classifier constructions resemble real world objects. As 
with all resemblance-oriented communication, the addressee’s familiarity with possible 
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targets (encyclopedic entries such as shapes, sizes, objects in the real world) provides 
them with a starting point for inference.  
6.2.2 Entity classifiers 
Entity classifiers refer to classifier constructions which most often represent objects 
in their entirety (Schembri 2003). They regularly include people, vehicles, or animals, but 
can include a variety of objects. Essentially, a signer will introduce a concept using a 
lexical sign, anchor that concept using a conventionalized handshape which can represent 
a class of possible referents, and comment on the object using location, motion, facing, 
manner, etc., driven by resemblance.   
Example 7. Entity classifier constructions 
  
The car drove forward and turned left. 
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The car drove forward and turned right. 
In the above examples, the handshape is used to represent a class of objects, specifically 
vehicles, which is narrowed to a specific referent based on context (if the conversation 
has been about the speaker’s car, for example), or explicit introduction (if the signer signs 
“my car” before the classifier construction). The direction, movement, and facing of the 
construction resembles the relative or absolute direction, movement, and facing of the 
vehicle in the real world or hypothetical situation. As with size and shape classifiers, 
entity classifiers make use of visual resemblance of the construction to the real world and 
the intended thought. Ultimately, entity classifiers are one of the strongest examples of 
resemblance in signed languages.  
6.2.3 Handling classifiers 
Handling classifier constructions use lexically established handshapes which 
represent classes of objects being handled; for instance, one handshape might be used to 
show how very small objects might be manipulated between the thumb and index finger, 
and another might be used to show how a cylindrical object would be manipulated. These 
lexical handshapes, in combination with movements which resemble their real world 
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counterparts, make use of resemblance to the real-world actions they represent, and in 
many ways function like highly structured mime.  
Example 8. Handling classifier construction 
   
YESTERDAY T-H-E-S-I-S 
  
RIPPED-(thesis)-IN-HALF  
(handling classifier for a flat, thin object, in this case, a stack of paper.) 
Yesterday, I ripped my thesis in half.  
 
In this example, the noun is identified through fingerspelling (since there is no lexical 
sign for the concept “thesis”), the lexical handling classifier handshape constrains the 
type of item being handled, and the movement mimics tearing the thesis in half. The use 
of resemblance is quite strong; an addressee can easily infer the signer’s meaning based 
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on the effect the motion would have on an actual thesis. Essentially, signers establish 
targets by way of conventional lexical signs, fingerspelling, or context, and then 
manipulate those targets in space as they would if they were actually performing the 
action. The movements themselves, while often simplified to conform to the rules of the 
language, deeply resemble the real world movements. Resemblance again acts as a 
trigger for a concept, providing a starting point for inference.  
Ultimately, I argue that classifier systems in signed languages make extensive use of 
resemblance. Showing, through imitation of movements, resemblance to locations, 
shapes, orientations, etc. is more accessible (at least in situations where one or more 
interlocutors are not fluent) and more information rich then using arbitrary lexical items, 
as is done in spoken languages. The use of resemblance to show location, motion, 
handling, and other areas in which classifiers may also help explain the differences in 
rates of signing and speaking.  
6.3 Locative constructions 
Locative phrases in signed languages are also heavily dependent on resemblance. In 
the vast majority of cases, an arbitrary locative item (such as the ASL sign IN) is 
eschewed in favor of a locative classifier construction. In these locative constructions, as 
with size and shape specifiers and entity classifiers, a handshape which can represent a 
class of objects is used to represent the real world objects being discussed. As with entity 
classifiers, the location and orientation of the handshapes resemble the relative locations 
of the objects in the real world, activating a concept and providing a starting point for 
inference. Classifier constructions contain procedural instructions to manipulate the 
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concepts they refer to, and can include great amounts of detail regarding orientation and 
location. These constructions often follow the following pragmatic sequence, as shown in 
a cross-linguistic study of locative constructions in five different signed languages 
(Eberle 2012):  
1. The signer produces the lexical signs for the object or objects being described, 
introducing the referents. 
2. The signer uses classifier handshapes to represent the objects, producing the 
signs relative to their actual or imaginary locations.  
3. This construction serves to:  
a. Introduce the encyclopedic entries for the ground and figure.  
b. Recreate the real-world space using a construction built from lexical 
handshapes, but guided by real-world locations and orientations.  
c. Instruct the addressee to procedurally pick out the real world targets and 
manipulate them just as presented in the signing space.  
In this way, locative constructions make heavy use of resemblance in order to make the 
location, orientation, shape of the objects, and the spatial relationship between the two 
highly accessible and economical. 
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Example 9. Locative construction 
   
TABLE PHONE PHONE-ON-TABLE 
The phone is on the table.  
In the above example, the first object, the table, is introduced, followed by the second 
object, the phone, identifying the referents. A simultaneous locative construction, 
“PHONE-ON-TABLE” is then used to show the location and orientation of the phone on 
the table. The construction makes use of resemblance imitate the real world spatial 
relationship between the phone and the table.  
 Signed language locative constructions are both visually motivated and procedural. 
Their visual motivation comes from their imitation of the real world and the iconicity of 
handshapes, and their procedural encoding can be seen in the way they instruct 
addressees to manipulate concepts in their minds, ultimately resulting in an information 
rich, highly inferential construction based on resemblance. In the following section, I 
discuss my final concrete example of resemblance in signed languages: facial expression. 
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6.4 Facial expression 
Facial expression occurs in sign languages both lexically and non-lexically. In some 
cases, facial expression serves grammatical purposes such as distinguishing content 
questions from polar questions. Some forms of facial expression, often referred to as 
mouth morphemes, can be analyzed as bound morphemes which only co-occur with 
certain signs, and can carry information about size, manner, proximity, the attitude or 
emotions of the target, and more (Bickford & Fraychineaud 2006). In other cases, facial 
expression is used to mimic the facial expressions of a human referent, either the signer 
(describing a past experience, for example) or another referent (describing a friend’s 
reaction to a shock, for instance), a common occurrence in role shift. The resemblance 
between the facial expression which accompanies the sign and the actual or hypothetical 
facial expressions which occurred in the situation being described provide additional 
evidence of the signer’s intent, and act as starting points for inference. While spoken 
languages make use of facial expression in this way as well, the visual nature of sign 
languages lends itself to even more frequent use of these forms of expression. Ultimately, 
the use of facial expression often resembles the facial expressions or attitudes of a real-
world referent and makes use of resemblance to achieve relevance. In the following 
chapter, I discuss the impact of the use of resemblance on cross-linguistic communication 
between signed languages. 
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CHAPTER 7                                                                                                  
THE IMPACT OF RESEMBLANCE ON SIGN LANGAUGE     
CROSS-LINGUISTIC COMMUNICATION 
 
It is common knowledge among sign language linguists that cross-linguistic 
communication between users of unrelated sign languages is significantly easier than 
communication between users of similarly unrelated spoken languages. While many 
features of sign language structure and the visual modality might contribute this 
phenomenon, I suggest the primary facilitating factor is the use of resemblance. I briefly 
describe the possible impact of resemblance-oriented communication on cross-linguistic 
communication below.  
7.1 Use of space 
Many communication strategies in signed languages make use of resemblance to the 
real world. Since humans have a wealth of knowledge about how the world works, such 
as physics, spatial relationships, size, shape, etc., the imitation of visual and spatial 
phenomenon provide starting points for inferring the signer’s meaning. Much of this 
knowledge transcends culture and ethnicity, so when a signer uses resemblance-oriented 
communication strategies, the signer and addressee’s shared knowledge about the world 
acts as common ground from which inferential can proceed. Spoken language, because of 
the aural modality, is less able to make use of resemblance in this way, and therefore 
shows less evidence of the use of resemblance.  
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7.2 Indexing 
Indexing instructs addressees to pick out a target which resembles the intended 
thought. It is common in both spoken and signed languages all over the world, and 
provides highly accessible evidence of the signer’s intended thought. Indexing is highly 
resemblance-oriented and can often function independently of language; the addressee 
does not need to share a common language with the signer to understand that the signer is 
making a proposition about the indexed target. Ultimately, signed languages use indexing 
productively, allowing them to rely less on arbitrary words for target identification.   
7.3 Directionality  
Directionality facilitates cross-linguistic communication between sign languages by 
clearly establishing agent and patient of transitive verbs such as HELP without relying 
arbitrary, language specific words. Additionally, directionality can imitate the real-world, 
providing addressees with visual starting points for inference. As with the use of space, 
directionality leverages context and knowledge about the real world for inferential 
communication grounded in resemblance. 
7.4 Lexical similarity and iconicity 
While the impact of lexical similarity is clear (namely easier communication), I have 
suggested that the root cause of the high lexical similarity between unrelated signed 
languages is resemblance. When communicating cross-linguistically, I hypothesize that 
the impact of resemblance is often great, because the iconic resemblance between the 
lexical item and real world object serves as a trigger for the addressee, acting 
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procedurally to instruct them to “pick out a target with the characteristics visually 
encoded in the sign.” As is the case with pantomime, this would not necessarily require 
them to know the conventional, lexical word for an item. Ultimately, though the iconicity 
present in signed languages is often quite abstract, signers can exaggerate and leverage 
iconicity when communicating cross linguistically.  
7.5 Deaf culture and experience 
One final factor in cross-linguistic communication is deaf culture and experience. As 
I mentioned previously, deaf communities around the world often share cultural and 
communicative values, such as visual means of getting attention, directness, high 
valuation of visual means of information sharing such as pictures and graphics, and many 
others. I hypothesize that many of these cultural similarities encourage the use of 
resemblance-oriented communication, and are therefore a contributing factor to cross-
linguistic communication.  
In the final chapter, I review the goal of the thesis, revisit major points, and suggest 
some possible implications for pragmatic and linguistic theory.  
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CHAPTER 8                                                                           
CONCLUSION 
The goal of this thesis has been to examine how humans make use of resemblance in 
ostensive inferential communication. I have defined resemblance as visual or aural 
similarity among a stimulus, the thought it is intended to activate, and the real world 
target that utterance is about.  
According to relevance theory, human communication is guided by expectations of 
relevance, an appropriate balance between cognitive benefits (information the addressee 
finds worthwhile) and processing effort (the amount of work required to understand that 
information) (Wilson & Sperber 2012). I have claimed that resemblance offers additional 
cognitive benefits and reduces processing effort, and given examples of resemblance-
oriented strategies in both spoken and signed languages.  
 Regarding ostensive communication in general, I have proposed that the range of 
human experience, including knowledge about how the world works, such as physics, 
spatial relationships, size, shape, etc., knowledge about human function and behavior, 
and the vast experience available through perception of the world all act as common 
ground, providing starting points for inferential communication. Conventionalization of 
codes primarily serves to reduce the processing effort required by inference; I have 
suggested that the commonality of human perception performs a similar function.  
While both spoken and signed languages make use of the resemblance between signs 
and the things they signify, signed languages are uniquely enabled by the visual modality 
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to leverage the benefits of resemblance-oriented communication. Signed language 
communication is produced in the same space as the things it signifies. Aided by 
relevance, context, inference, and encyclopedic knowledge about the world, signers are 
able to quickly see the resemblance between sign and signified, even when arbitrary 
linguistic conventions fail. 
My claim that resemblance has a role to play in human communication raises 
significant questions about the widely held stance that language is inherently arbitrary. 
As long ago as 360 B.C.E. with the writing of Plato’s dialogue titled Cratylus, people 
have been questioning whether language is natural, in which words are inherently 
connected with the things they represent, or conventional, in which words are arbitrary 
and determined by consensus (Plato 1999). The use of resemblance in human 
communication suggests that the connection between signs and the things they signify is 
often meaningful. If this is true, we must consider the implications for modern linguistic 
analysis and adjust linguistic theory to accurately account for the use of resemblance in 
human communication.  
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APPENDIX A:                                                                                  
GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
Ad hoc concepts 
The fine tuning of concepts in context, referred to in relevance theory as ad hoc 
concepts, is particularly important for this thesis. Ad hoc concepts are identified by 
Sperber and Wilson as the components of an utterance which are deemed relevant 
(by following the relevance theoretic comprehension procedure) and therefore used 
in the construction of the explicature. (Wilson & Sperber 2012:16–23) For example, 
in metaphor, an utterance such as “Dan is a machine” can be quite vague; however, 
in certain contexts, the connection between the two concepts is stronger or weaker 
based on the relevance of the individual characteristics of “Dan” and “machine.” In 
one context, the speaker could mean that Dan is very efficient; while in another, they 
could mean that Dan is emotionless, or perhaps in a third context both meanings are 
relevant.  
Basically, the hearer is creating an ad hoc concept for “Dan” and “machine,” which 
is made up of only the relevant characteristics of each.  
Arbitrary  
Arbitrary language is that which has no discernible motivation for why a code (word 
or sign) stands for a given item. Why do we call a dog a dog? There is no reason; it is 
arbitrary. Arbitrary words are often a matter of convention; the standardization of a 
word, gesture, head shake, sound, or any other stimuli, by common use and unsaid or 
explicit agreement. See Convention.  
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Coding and decoding, encoded 
Coding and decoding are the processes by which communicators produce utterances 
which represent concepts, and addressee’s understand those codes to represent 
concepts. Essentially, the communicator thinks of a dog and speaks the associated, 
conventional word dog. This word encodes the concept “dog”. The hearer decodes 
the word dog, and accesses the encyclopedic entry. Inference is then used to arrive at 
the communicator’s intended meaning.  
Cognitive effects/cognitive benefits 
Cognitive effects can be loosely defined as any change of the addressee’s thoughts; 
they could be as small as learning what time it is, or as complex as understanding 
that the speaker is telling you the time because they do not want you to be late for 
class. They can function to strengthen or weaken existing assumptions, as well. 
(Wilson & Sperber 2012) 
Conceptual and Procedural meaning  
Traditionally, as defined by Wilson and Sperber, (1986; 1995; 2012) conceptually 
encoded information is that part of linguistic communication which deals with 
concepts, (such as objects, people, emotions, or anything else which triggers an 
encyclopedic entry). Conceptual information makes up the bulk of our utterances, 
and is primarily conventionalized; the word cat triggers all we know about cats, and 
the connection between them is learned.  Procedurally coded information consists of 
instructions for how to process conceptual information, either from the utterance or 
context. Examples of procedurally encoded information include things like pronouns, 
discourse connectives, conjunctions, and logical connectives.  
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Conventionalization/conventional 
Conventionalization is the standardization of a word, gesture, head shake, sound, or 
any other stimuli, by common use and unsaid or explicit agreement. Why do we call 
a dog a dog? Because it is a convention. In this case, dog is an arbitrary convention.  
Economy/Economical  
I use the term economy to mean efficient balance between cognitive effects and 
processing effort. Basically, humans like to understand things without having to 
work too hard. Economical communication uses different communication strategies 
to achieve this.  
Encyclopedic entry 
Everything you know about something; essentially the sum of all your experiences 
with an object, entity, phenomenon, emotion, color, etc. An encyclopedic entry about 
a dog might include things like “dogs have four legs” “dogs are furry” “dogs 
sometimes bite” and so on. When you hear the word dog, these are things you call up 
in your mind. See also conceptual and procedural meaning.  
Explicatures  
Sperber and Wilson (1986) used the term ‘explicature’ to refer the fully-
propositional forms of an utterance, after referent assignment and disambiguation. 
Inference often plays a part in enrichment, as well. The following sentence shows the 
difference between what is said and the explicatures: “He arrived before her” might 
have explicatures such as “John arrived at time x which was earlier than Sue, who 
arrived at time y”. See Implicatures.  
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Higher level explicatures 
A base explicature is the simple, fully-developed propositional form of an utterance, 
such as “Dan says John is tall,” while a higher level explicature is “constructed …by 
development of encoded schematic sentence meaning.” (Wilson & Sperber 2012:23) 
Essentially, higher-level explicatures are other propositions that follow from the first. 
If a base explicature is “He arrived before her,” the addressee might understand the 
following higher-level explicatures: that the speaker is saying that John arrived first, 
believes that John arrived first, is happy that John arrived first, and so on. Higher 
level explicatures may be explicit (stated in the sentence) or implicit, requiring 
inference to understand. 
Ideophones 
Ideophones, constructions which aurally imitate the real world through 
onomatopoeia, vowel lengthening, reduplication, etc. are an example of resemblance 
in which the resemblance between the sign and the signified is based on perception. 
(Lydall et al. 2000) The International Symposium on Ideophones concluded “that 
ideophones and similar words have a special dramaturgic function that differs from 
all other word classes: Ideophones simulate an event, an emotion, a perception 
through language.” (Voeltz and Killian-Hatz 2001, 3) 
Implicatures 
‘Implicature’ refers to what is implied—things communicated by an utterance in a 
given context, but not explicitly present in the utterance itself (Sperber & Wilson 
1986). Implicatures are understood through inference, and can often be thought of as 
the logical steps taken from the utterance to arrive at the speaker’s intended meaning 
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(Wilson & Sperber 2012:77). To continue with the above example, if someone asked 
“Was John late for Sue’s party?” and was answered by the utterance “He arrived 
before her,” the implicature is that John was not late for Sue’s party.  
Inference/inferring/inferential communication  
Essentially, inference is the process of reasoning we follow in understanding 
communication. It consists of following logical steps, which may be explicit (said 
aloud) or implicit (understood from context, implied). Inferential communication 
relies more on reasoning and logic than understanding the meaning of the words 
themselves.  
Linguistically encoded 
Linguistic encoding includes whatever information can be retrieved from an 
utterance solely by knowledge of the language. Non-linguistically encoded 
information would include things like body language, tone of voice, etc. which adds 
to the meaning of an utterance, but not in a way which is understood linguistically.  
Locus/Loci 
The use of a point or points in three-dimensional space in signed languages. Often, a 
locus is used as an anchor for a referring expression such as a pronoun.  
Metarepresentation  
Humans have the ability to contemplate and describe the representations of those 
objects in an abstract way, essentially thinking about a thought or talking about an 
utterance (ad infinitum), referred to as metarepresentation. (Wilson & Sperber 2012) 
Aside from letting humans think about the thoughts of others (critical for making 
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utterances optimally relevant to an addressee), it allows for the reuse of utterances in 
different contexts, ranging from direct quotation to very loose use. Some quotation 
makes use of a loose kind of similarity known as interpretive resemblance. Wilson 
and Sperber define this as “resemblance in content: that is, sharing of implications. 
Two representations resemble each other (in a context) to the extent that they share 
logical and contextual implications.” (Wilson & Sperber 2012:244) 
Metarepresentation allows humans to discuss utterances or thoughts themselves, or 
the thoughts of others. This is ability is demonstrated in the use of quotation, which 
can range from direct quotation, essentially literal imitation of another utterance, to 
loose quotation, the paraphrasing of another utterance, to echoic use, which conveys 
attitudes by modifying quotations. (Wilson and Sperber 2012, 230–258) 
Naïve psychology  
Naïve psychology is the ability to think about the mental states of others. For 
example, if you watch John put a ball into a box, you know that John knows that the 
ball is in the box. (Wilson & Sperber 2012:331–338) See Metarepresentation.  
Narrowing and broadening 
Narrowing and broadening refer to the adjustment of concepts to make them 
relevant. For instance, if I say “Dan is like a machine,” you will automatically 
narrow your understanding of machine to only the characteristics which can sensibly 
be compared to “Dan.” Broadening is the reverse, in which a very specific term is 
used loosely to apply in ways it would normally not; consider the example “That 
man is in a black mood.”   
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Ostensive communication 
Ostensive communication can be defined as any communication which is intended to 
inform the hearer and conveys that intention to communicate. (Wilson & Sperber 
2012) 
Pragmatics 
“the study of language use, as opposed to language structure.”  (Wilson & Sperber 
2012). Pragmatics is concerned with what happens cognitively during 
communication. 
Processing effort 
The mental effort required to comprehend the speaker’s meaning. In most situations, 
we are able to come up with a possible understanding of an utterance, but often that 
explanation is either not relevant, or is too far-fetched to be believable. Basically, 
when we communicate we apply Occam’s razor: the simplest interpretation of an 
utterance (which makes sense given the context) is often the best.  
Relevance  
“Relevance is defined as a property of inputs to cognitive processes. The processing 
of an input is (e.g. an utterance) may yield some cognitive effects (e.g. revisions of 
beliefs). Everything else being equal, the greater the effects, the greater the relevance 
of the input. The processing of the input (and the derivation of these effects) involves 
some mental effort. Everything else being equal the greater the effort, the lower the 
relevance.” (Wilson & Sperber 2012) 
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Resemblance  
Resemblance is used in a general way to mean one thing is in some way similar to 
another. For signed languages, this similarity is visual; one thing looks like another, 
at least in some ways. For example, I can say that a dog resembles a cat; one might 
understand that to mean that they both have four legs, are furry, and so on. An 
utterance resembles another insofar as they are similar (measurable by waveforms, 
perhaps) or share the same content (mean the same thing). The scale between these 
two is a matter of description (measurably similar) or interpretation (similar in 
content, which is more difficult to measure).  
I define resemblance as the visual or aural similarity between a stimulus (such as a 
spoken or signed utterance), the thought it is intended to activate, (mental 
representation in the mind of a human) and the real world target (situation, object, 
other utterance, etc.) that utterance is about. 
Sign and signified 
A sign is any conventionalized stimulus, a signified is what it stands for. “Dog” is 
the sign, while an addressee’s conceptual knowledge about dogs (and all the dogs in 
the real world) are the signified.  
Stimuli 
Anything used to intentionally communicate; a hand gesture, sideways look, nodding 
of the head, words, signs, nodding of the head, etc.  
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Target 
Whatever thought, situation, concept, fact, idea, referent, etc. which a speaker/signer 
is referring to, trying to get the addressee to think of, or use as a comparison with 
something else. Basically, anything a person is talking about.  
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